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Are banks’ below-par own debt repurchases a cause for prudential concern?
ABSTRACT Leading up to the implementation of Basel III, European banks repurchased below-
par debt securities. Banks are subjected to a prudential filter that excludes unrealized gains on
liabilities from changes in own credit standing from the calculation of capital ratios. By repurchas-
ing securities, unrealized gains become realized and increase Core Tier 1 capital. We show that
poorly capitalized banks repurchased securities and lost about e9.1bn in premiums to compensate
debt holders. Banks also repurchased the most loss-absorbing securities, for which they paid the
highest premiums. These premiums increase with leverage and in times of stress. Hence debt
repurchases are a cause for prudential concern.
Keywords: Banking, fair values, repurchases, prudential filters, subordinated debt.
JEL codes: E58, G21, G32, G35, M41.
I. Introduction
In the years 2009–2013, many European banks repurchased debt that traded below par with the
purpose of increasing their Core Tier 1 capital ratio. In anticipation of the new capital requirements
that would enter into force in 2014, banks repurchased these securities to turn an unrealized fair
value gain into a realized one. Bank regulation excludes these unrealized fair value gains from the
calculation of regulatory capital by means of a prudential filter, thereby giving banks an incentive
to engage in Liability Management Exercises (LMEs) – i.e., buybacks of debt capital securities.1
Using data of unprecedented detail, we examine the determinants of 720 European LMEs, as well
as their effects on solvency and liquidity and the wealth they transfer from shareholders to debt
holders.
According to Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2012), these buybacks can create so-
cial benefits since they improve banks’ leverage ratios, despite the costs they impose on existing
shareholders. Our evidence, however, shows that a significant part of these benefits failed to mate-
rialize, as a consequence of the interplay between prudential rules that prohibit banks to recognize
unrealized fair value gains on their liabilities that arise from changes in their own credit standing
and a context that made it difficult for banks to increase capital through established ways such as
raising capital, retaining profits or selling assets. As a result of this interplay, mainly less solvent
banks engaged in LMEs, during times of economic stress. In addition, banks bought back securi-
ties that were meant to contribute the most to the safety and soundness of the banking system. They
repurchased the most loss-absorbing capital securities. The LMEs resulted in a loss of liquidity
and a reduction in total regulatory capital. These consequences are opposite to what prudential
rules aim to achieve, namely a safe and sound banking system. Lastly, cumulative abnormal re-
turns after the announcement of a LME were negative, highlighting that LMEs are generally bad
news for equity investors.
1Regulatory adjustments applied to accounting equity to arrive at regulatory capital are often denoted with the
term “prudential filters”.
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In the years leading up to the implementation of Basel III in Europe (2009–2013), banks’ de-
mand for equity capital increased significantly. Whereas under Basel II banks could satisfy capital
requirements with 2% equity over risk-weighted assets, under Basel III this percentage could be
as high as 14.5%. Many European banks could not satisfy these augmented capital requirements
within the relatively short notice through conventional methods. Issuing shares, for example, was
not always possible for state-owned banks and because of weak investor appetite. In addition,
issuing shares dilutes existing shareholders, especially when share prices are low. Alternatively,
retaining profits would entail cutting dividend payments, which would give a bad signal to in-
vestors. Moreover, retaining profits is only meaningful for profitable banks, but profitable banks
were often less pressed to meet higher capital requirements. A third way to increase capital ratios
would be to sell assets with high risk weights – namely by “de-risking”. However, in the inter-
est of small and medium-sized enterprises, European supervisors actively discouraged banks from
de-risking, as evidenced by the EBA press release on the EBA recapitalization exercise and EBA’s
2013 recommendation on the preservation of capital (EBA, 2011b, 2013).
In the absence of alternative viable means to increase capital, many European banks responded
to the higher anticipated capital requirements by buying back debt that traded below par. These
banks actively managed their liabilities to realize a fair value gain that originated from a weak
credit standing. This is where the prudential rules come into play. To safeguard the safety and
soundness of the banking system, banks are subjected to a prudential rule that disallows them from
including, for the calculation of regulatory capital ratios, any unrealized gains or losses on their
liabilities valued at fair value that are due to changes in their own credit standing – see Article 64(4)
of EC (2006).
To illustrate this prudential rule, a bank with a low credit standing may wish to recognize the
unrealized fair value gain on a debt security that trades below par. Recognizing the unrealized gain
will directly improve the bank’s equity level and its Core Tier 1 ratio. Unfortunately, prudential
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regulation disallows the recognition of this gain.2 However, a bank can circumvent the derecog-
nition requirement by repurchasing the debt security at the lower market value in an LME – thus
turning the unrealized gain into a realized one. That is, at a cost – to compensate the debt holder for
parting from his security, a bank pays a buyback premium. This buyback premium arises because,
for a debt holder to be willing to sell his security, the buyback price should reflect the value of the
debt after the buyback. Given that the buyback reduces the bank’s default probability, the value of
debt increases, leading to positive buyback premiums.
Cre´dit Agricole offers an example of a typical LME. On April 1, 2009, it announced the buy-
back of an Upper Tier 2 debt capital security that traded significantly below par, namely at 52%.
This is a typical example, as it involves the repurchase of a debt capital security that counts towards
a bank’s total capital ratio, and for this reason trades at a significant discount, as we will explain
later on. Cre´dit Agricole’s motivation for the LME was to increase its solvency ratio.3 Shortly after
the announcement, Cre´dit Agricole exchanged £545m of this security at a price of 72%, thus pay-
ing the holders a 20% buyback premium (Cre´dit Agricole, 2011b,a). This LME would add e170m
(£153m) to income, and would increase equity and Core Tier 1 capital by 5.03 basis points, at a
time when Cre´dit Agricole’s Core Tier 1 capital ratio was 8%.4 Offsetting this gain is a reduction
of total regulatory capital by £545m (e605m) due to the decrease in Tier 2 capital. In addition,
at the expense of equity, Cre´dit Agricole paid the debt security holders a cash premium of £114m
(20% of £545m). In the absence of the derecognition requirement, the total unrealized fair value
2The rule that excludes gains and losses resulting from changes in own creditworthiness is symmetrical. Unre-
alized gains originating from a deteriorated own credit standing are not included in regulatory capital. Likewise, the
loss on a debt security associated with an improved credit standing does not affect regulatory capital either. This rule
aligns the measurement of fair-valued liabilities with that of liabilities accounted for at amortized cost.
3The Cre´dit Agricole invitation to offer mentions: “The Notes currently trade at a significant discount compared
to their initial issue price. If the transaction is successful, it will result in a modest improvement in the Tier 1 solvency
ratio of [Cre´dit Agricole].”
4Note that we used the April 9, 2009 GBPEUR exchange rate of 1.1103. The e170m is pre-tax. After tax, the
amount would have contributed (even) less to Core Tier 1.
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gain could have been recognized as net income, which would increase common equity and Core
Tier 1 capital without a decrease in total regulatory capital or a loss of liquidity.
The illustration shows that the prevailing market conditions in combination with regulatory
preferences that discourage de-risking and exclude unrealized fair value gains and losses arising
from changes in own credit standing from the calculation of regulatory capital resulted in signifi-
cant unintended consequences. As the Cre´dit Agricole example shows, in exchange for a limited
increase in the Core Tier 1 solvency ratio, banks sacrificed cash to make debt holders part from
their securities. The LMEs that banks executed were at the expense of their total capital ratios and
their liquidity, neither of which were in the interest of a safe and sound banking system nor in the
interest of banks’ owners.
There are several reasons why regulators require banks to derecognize unrealized gains and
losses on changes in own credit standing. For example, the value of liabilities may be only tem-
porarily depressed. This would make the unrealized gain a temporary one. It would therefore be
imprudent for a bank to consider the gain as realized, as that would allow a bank to distribute it to
shareholders instead of preserving it for the redemption of the liability in full. Another often-cited
reason for the derecognition requirement is that gains made on a deteriorated own credit standing
are counter-intuitive (ECB, 2001; Barth, Hodder, and Stubben, 2008; Alloway, 2009).
Surprisingly little research has been done into the (economic) effects of the prudential filter on
unrealized gains and losses originating from changes in own credit standing. But policies that rely
on intuition prompt closer examination. The requirement to derecognize the unrealized fair value
gain on a weakened credit standing creates an incentive to arbitrage. Option theory shows that
the gain increases with leverage and at the same time, given the prudential filter, strengthens the
incentive of a bank to realize the fair value gain through the execution of an LME. This incentive
becomes even stronger when banks are pressured to increase their capital while having limited
alternative opportunities to do so.
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Most of the LMEs involved hybrid debt instruments that counted towards a bank’s regulatory
capital.5 Buying these instruments back is subject to rules, with particularly strict rules applying to
debt capital instruments of the highest prudential quality, where the quality of capital instruments
primarily relies on their capacity to absorb losses. The buyback restrictions ensure that instruments
are available to absorb losses, for example by way of a write-down, a conversion into equity, or the
cancellation or delay of coupon payments. At the same time, the higher loss-absorbing capacity
of these instruments makes them more attractive buyback targets: the high loss-absorbing capacity
increases the likelihood of the instrument being written off or the bank skipping a coupon payment,
which means that these instruments trade at deeper discounts when a bank’s solvency ratio is low.
This paper analyzes 720 LMEs of banks from 16 European countries from April 2009 to De-
cember 2013. In a drive to improve the quality and quantity of regulatory capital, these banks
engaged in LMEs with the objective to realize fair value gains on debt instruments and add these
gains to Core Tier 1 capital. We have access to rich and detailed LME data. The comprehensive
nature of the data allows us to examine the determinants of LMEs, as well their effects on solvency
and liquidity and the wealth they transfer from shareholders to holders of regulatory debt capital
instruments and holders of subordinated debt. Since we are the first to investigate LMEs in the
context of higher anticipated bank capital requirements, we present extensive descriptive evidence
on which banks engaged in LMEs as well as on the cost and inefficiency of LMEs.
We then use regression analysis to examine the determinants of an LME. The results show
that the likelihood of an LME decreases (increases) with a bank’s solvency ratio (leverage) and
decreases with bank size. We also document that banks from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain, and listed banks were more likely to engage in an LME. The likelihood decreases with
profitability and increases with the dividend pay-out ratio. In a next step, we examine the premium
that banks pay to an investor to part from his instrument. Our results confirm that the premium
increases with the loss-absorbing capacity of capital instruments, economy-wide financial stress
measured by the CBOE Volatility Index, and leverage. In addition, the premium decreases with
5From here on, we use the terms “security” and “instrument” interchangeably.
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the size of a bank. We also investigate whether banks target instruments with a high capacity to
absorb losses. We document a negative relation between bank solvency and the probability to buy
back the most loss-absorbing instruments. In addition, banks repurchase these instruments more
often in times of economic stress. Lastly, we document an unfavorable response from investors
around the announcement of a LME, and this response worsens with solvency. Investors penalize
relatively solvent banks for engaging in LMEs, which is what one would expect: under normal
circumstances, healthy banks would generally not engage in LMEs that benefit debt holders at the
expense of equity holders.
Our results show that the prudential filter on unrealized fair value gains originating from a
change in own credit standing has no obvious positive effects on the safety and soundness of the
banking system. To the contrary: in a context of economic uncertainty, poorly capitalized banks,
for which cash conservation is paramount, engaged in the least efficient and least cash conserving
LMEs. This is precisely the opposite of what the prudential filter aims to achieve.
Our paper contributes to an emerging field of banking research that examines prudential filters.
Existing research on prudential filters is sparse and limited to the filter for Available-for-Sale debt
instruments (Bischof, Bru¨ggemann, and Daske, 2014). Our paper examines the prudential filter
on unrealized gains or losses on liabilities valued at fair value that are due to changes in a bank’s
own credit standing. More important is that recent literature recognizes prudential filters as an area
of future research (Beatty and Liao, 2014; BCBS, 2015), which is surprising given the attention
prudential filters have attracted in the past. For example, the prudential filter on fair value gains
and losses due to changes in own credit standing was the subject of controversy around the intro-
duction of IFRS in 2005 (EC, 2005).6 In addition, whereas there is ample literature on the level
of regulatory bank capital (Miller, 1995; Mehran and Thakor, 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Ad-
mati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer, 2013; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Jonghe and O¨ztekin,
6Another prudential filter that attracted controversy is the filter on deferred tax assets (DTAs), which should be
deducted from bank capital (Merler, 2015; Sebag and Brunsden, 2015). The EU implementation of Basel III (the
CRR) however recognizes some DTAs as capital [Article 39.2 of EC (2013a)].
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2015), papers that examine the structure of regulatory bank capital are sparse. Our results show
that banks appear willing to sacrifice total regulatory capital (i.e., hybrid Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital)
for limited gains in Core Tier 1 regulatory capital. Lastly, given the comprehensive data that we
use, we are able to document the determinants and consequences of LMEs, including the costs
they impose on various debt and equity holders.
Our results are relevant for policy makers and standard setters, as the requirement to derec-
ognize unrealized fair value gains that are the result of a change in own credit standing can be
arbitraged and introduce unintended consequences. Our analyses suggest that regulators should
prevent banks from buying back the most loss-absorbing instruments, consistent with the argu-
ment made by Admati et al. (2012) that if deleveraging is done inefficiently, regulators should
limit banks’ discretion.
II. Literature and Regulation
A. Literature
There is limited literature on debt buybacks, and none of the existing papers study regulatory
bank capital. In addition, prior studies neither focus on a change in capital structure in a context
that incentivizes banks to augment solvency ratios during challenging economic times, nor do they
examine the exclusion from regulatory bank capital of cumulative unrealized gains and losses on
changes in own credit standing.
Early studies on LMEs rely on small samples. For example, Johnson, Pari, and Rosenthal
(1989), examine 42 insubstance defeasance transactions over the years 1980–1985. These trans-
actions are akin to debt securitizations, where US accounting standards allowed firms to purchase
US government securities to take risky debt off balance (FASB, 1983). The positive difference
between the value of the securities and the value of debt could be recognized as income and be
added to retained earnings. Johnson et al. document that debt holders benefited from these trans-
actions; however, they find no evidence that shareholders financed these gains. Johnson et al.
also document negative stock returns around the announcement of a transaction, but this result
is not significant. Hand, Hughes, and Sefcik (1990), in another paper on insubstance defeasance
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transactions, show that these transactions are generally bad news. However, Hand et al. remain
inconclusive on the motivation for insubstance defeasance transactions. Their sample firms de-
feased for various reasons: managing earnings, attempting to avoid violating restrictions in bond
covenants, and because it was the best use for excess cash on hand.
Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramı´rez (1995) examine the wealth effects of high-yield bond work-
outs of 40 distressed US firms during the years 1989–1992. They document mixed evidence:
Exchange offers lead to negative announcement returns, whereas tender offers lead to positive an-
nouncement returns. Kruse, Nohel, and Todd (2014) also show mixed results for announcements of
debt repurchases. Returns around announcements of exchange offers are positive and marginally
significant, whereas returns around announcements of cash offers are insignificant. The strongest
positive returns that Kruse et al. document are around announcements of assets sales. But then
again, that result relies on 19 observations.
Wingler and Jud (1990) also find mixed evidence for the stock returns around the announce-
ment of a tender offer. They examine bond tenders of 26 US utilities over the period 1983–1988
and show that investors favor an offer when a firm’s prospects are improving. For firms with
declining prospects, investors perceive tender offers as bad news. De Jong, Roosenboom, and
Schramade (2009), on the other hand, show no negative abnormal share returns in their study of
109 bond tender offers by 96 European firms over the period 1996–2005.
Mann and Powers (2007) use a sample of 943 tender offers from US corporates. Like Wingler
and Jud (1990), Mann and Powers use a sample where bonds that trade at a premium dominate.
They show that tender offers are more likely when credit spreads are tight.
Regarding the accounting for debt, there is limited literature which pertains to firms that elected
the fair value option around the time of the introduction of SFAS No. 159 The Fair Value Option
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for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities in the United States (FASB, 2007). In addition, this
literature focuses mainly on fair valued assets.7
Song (2008) and Henry (2008) show that firms opportunistically elect the fair value option.
In contrast, Guthrie, Irving, and Sokolowsky (2011) find no evidence of opportunistic use of the
fair value option. Liu, Chang, and Ryan (2011) distinguish between initial and regular adopters
of SFAS No. 159, and show that regular adopters acted according to the intent of SFAS No. 159,
though some early adopters may have acted opportunistically. Couch, Thibodeau, and Wu (2014)
find that SFAS No. 159 adopters have a significantly greater increase in earnings volatility than
non-adopters. The main cause of this result is a dominant number of firms that adopt SFAS
No. 159 for assets only, which runs against the spirit of the fair value option, as its use should
mitigate the accounting mismatch between assets and liabilities by managing them jointly.
One empirical study that investigates fair value accounting for liabilities is Barth et al. (2008)
who empirically examine the prediction of Merton (1974) on the moderating effect of debt on
equity changes in the event of a change in own credit standing. Merton predicts that a one dollar
reduction in debt does not translate into a one dollar increase in equity. Barth et al. empirically con-
firm this prediction. In addition, they find that the liability gains on a deteriorated credit standing
are more than offset by deteriorated asset values.
Theoretical work by Black and Scholes (1973) shows that deleveraging introduces a transfer
of wealth from shareholders to debt holders. Consequently, shareholders will resist deleveraging.
However, Myers (1977) implies that the resistance disappears when a firm accepts a project with a
net present value that offsets the wealth transfer.
Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2015) go further than Black and Scholes and My-
ers. They demonstrate that shareholders also suffer from a dilution effect: the price a firms offers
7LMEs affect earnings, and therefore the association with earnings management may conjure up. However, our
paper primarily focuses on liability management, as the management of liabilities is the primary and predominant
motive for LMEs, see also the second paragraph of Section III.
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for buying back debt should make a debt holder indifferent between selling a debt instrument and
holding on to it. This will only happen if the repurchase price equals the higher post-buyback debt
level. For highly levered firms (i.e., banks) a free-rider problem ensues, which makes it punitively
unattractive to reduce leverage. Consequently, Admati et al. argue that shareholders resist any and
all deleveraging. Once indebted, the cost of deleveraging only increases, leading to increases in
leverage, a phenomenon that Admati et al. call the “leverage ratchet effect”.
Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1989, 1990) present reasonings similar to the dilution effect. How-
ever, they do so in the context of the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s. Bulow and Rogoff
show that debtor countries do not benefit from buying back their lowly priced debt. All that hap-
pens in a repurchase transaction is that the price of debt rises to the higher post-buyback level. The
prospective gains of a buyback are therefore deceptive.
B. Regulation
B.1. Introduction
This section describes the relevant regulation that applies to bank debt instruments and their
repurchases. It describes the accounting and solvency rules that were in effect during the period
that led up to the entry into force of the EU Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), the Euro-
pean implementation of Basel III. It includes a description of (i) the IFRS rules on the fair value
option (EC, 2002), (ii) the relevant European capital requirement rules as well as applicable guide-
lines and standards from the EBA, and (iii) the rules governing LMEs.
The description of the regulation shows that between April 2009 and December 2013, Euro-
pean regulators actively managed their expectations regarding the quantity and quality of regula-
tory bank capital. This led to an increased demand for Core Tier 1 capital (equity net of prudential
adjustments). More importantly, the description shows that banks relied on LMEs to satisfy the in-
creased demand for Core Tier 1 capital, as alternative ways to increase capital were not necessarily
viable during this time period.
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B.2. IFRS and the fair value option
The default treatment for liabilities under IFRS is to recognize them at fair value initially, and
subsequently at amortized cost using the effective interest method (IAS 39 §47 and IFRS 9 Sec-
tion 4.2.1). Under IAS 39 and IFRS 9, the fair value option allows firms to designate instruments
as “at fair value through profit or loss”. Firms can apply the fair value option under certain condi-
tions. One such condition is that firms manage their instruments on a fair value basis. This implies
that firms should be able to trade these instruments on a daily basis, which contradicts prudential
rules that require instruments to be permanently available to absorb losses.
As a consequence, bank regulators discourage the use of the fair value option for capital in-
struments. For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) used its influence to tightly control the
fair value option, which led to disagreement with the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) at the time of the introduction of IFRS in Europe. Consequently, Europe endorsed IFRS in
2004 with the exception of two “carve-outs”, of which one related to provisions governing the use
of the fair value option.8 Europe retroactively eliminated the fair value option carve-out in June
2005 (EC, 2005). However, the elimination did not apply unconditionally to banks. From 2005
onward, European bank capital rules require the derecognition of any unrealized gains or losses on
own liabilities valued at fair value that are due to changes in a banks’ own credit standing (CEBS,
2004; EC, 2006).9
Moreover, in 2006, the Basel committee adopted the IAS 39 (now IFRS 9) conditions for the
use of the fair value option, including the requirement that instruments are managed on a fair value
basis.10 The committee also decided that banks should adjust their regulatory capital for gains and
losses from changes in own credit risk as a result of applying the fair value option to financial
8The second carve-out pertained to provisions on hedge accounting.
9The United States followed suit – it introduced an equivalent rule in 2007 (FFIEC, 2007).
10The accounting rules in the United States (SFAS 159 and its successor Subtopic 825-10: Recognition and Mea-
surement of Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities) do not mention this condition, nor does the US implementation
of Basel III (OCC, 2013).
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liabilities. The motivation to adopt this prudential filter is the particular concern that, if a bank
applies the option to its own debt, “it will recognise a gain and a resulting increase in its capital
when its own creditworthiness deteriorates. Such an outcome would undermine the quality of
capital measures and performance ratios” (BCBS, 2006b). The rule is now part of Basel III and the
implementations thereof in Europe and the United States (BCBS, 2010; EC, 2013a; OCC, 2013).
B.3. EU capital requirements and bank capital structure
Until the entry into force of the European implementation of Basel III in 2014, banks were
subjected to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD: EC (2006)). This directive reflects the
(first) Basel accord and the Basel II Framework, which require that 8% of risk-weighted assets is
backed by capital to absorb losses [Basel I: BCBS (1988), Basel II: BCBS (2006a)].
The CRD allowed banks to structure regulatory capital to minimize the use of equity. The
8% requirement for capital adequacy, for example, pertains to the BIS ratio for total capital. This
ratio is the sum of Tier 1 capital (core capital) and Tier 2 capital (or supplementary capital) both
divided by risk-weighted assets. Banks could satisfy the total capital requirement with a maximum
of 50% Tier 2 capital, where Tier 2 capital instruments are subordinated debt instruments. Table 1
gives an overview of the regulatory capital requirements and the loss-absorbing capacity of capital
instruments.
[Table 1 about here]
To satisfy Tier 1 capital requirements under the CRD, banks could rely on hybrid capital– for
example, preferred shares and perpetual or permanent instruments that were subordinated to Tier 2
instruments. They could use hybrid capital instruments to a maximum of 50% of capital of the
highest quality (book equity net of prudential adjustments). Consequently, Total Tier 1 capital
would allow up to 50% of hybrid capital substituting for equity. Given these limits, banks could, in
theory, satisfy the 8% regulatory capital requirements with only 2% of equity over risk-weighted
assets.
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As a response to the global financial crisis, and to the capital standards that were in force at
the time, bank regulators vouched to improve the quality and quantity of regulatory capital. In
particular, they responded to conclusions of the April G20 of 2009, where global leaders agreed
to improve the quality, quantity, and the international consistency of capital in the banking system
(G20, 2009).11
B.4. The quality of capital
Soon after the April 2009 G20, EBA’s predecessor (CEBS) published guidelines that tightened
the requirements for equity instruments, also known as Core Tier 1, or core capital of the highest
quality (CEBS, 2010). The reason for this tightening was the broad definition of this element of
core capital under the CRD, which created a proliferation of certificates and pseudo-shares that
could count as core capital of the highest quality. CEBS aligned the new definition of Core Tier 1
with the then forthcoming definition of regulatory bank capital of Basel III (BCBS, 2009, 2010).
The publication of Basel III in December 2010 presented a new definition of capital. The
structure of regulatory capital that it defined had kept the two tiers (BCBS, 2010). However, it
emphasized the importance of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), a new item of Tier 1 capital. This
CET1 is capital of the highest quality: Equity capital after the deduction of specific items, such
as, for example, goodwill and holdings in financial companies.12 Compared to Basel II, Basel III
applies an increased number of deductions to capital. For example, the deduction of defined benefit
pension fund assets is new under Basel III. In addition, Basel III applies the deductions to equity
(which is a subset of Tier 1 capital), whereas Basel II applied the deductions to total regulatory cap-
11This is just weeks after the meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, who showed
more restraint in their commitment to reform and strengthen the global financial system: they wanted to keep capital
requirements “unchanged until recovery is assured.” (GHOS, 2009)
12Note that CET1 is the Basel III definition of core capital of the highest quality, whereas Basel II and implemen-
tations thereof do not define an equivalent of this element of capital. Instead, reference is made to Core Tier 1. In
practice, this is Tier 1 capital net of hybrid Tier 1 capital instruments.
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ital.13 As a consequence of these regulatory developments, the demand for equity capital increased
significantly.
B.5. The quantity of capital
Besides increasing the quality of capital, Basel III also requires banks to hold at minimum 4.5%
of CET1 over risk-weighted assets, plus 2.5% CET1 in a capital conservation buffer. To mitigate
procyclicality in the financial sector, Basel III requires a countercyclical buffer that raises the CET1
requirements by again 2.5%. On top of these CET1 requirements is a capital surcharge for sys-
tematically important banks which requires them to have in issue an additional 1% to 5% of CET1
capital. The total CET1 requirement can thus stack up to 14.5% under the EU’s implementation of
Basel III, the CRR (EC, 2013b).
Regarding hybrid and subordinated instruments, Basel III and CRR require banks to have 1.5%
Additional Tier 1 capital and 2% Tier 2 capital. However, banks were not forced to issue Basel III
compliant hybrid instruments to replace existing capital instruments before the entry into force
of Basel III. Old-style instruments would be gradually phased out between January 1, 2014 and
January 1, 2021 (EC, 2013a).
It is important to realize that even though Basel III would only enter into force in 2014, banks
responded to these regulatory initiatives by issuing instruments that anticipated the upcoming re-
quirements. They did not, however, issue substantial amounts of common equity. Marinova and
van Veldhuizen (2014) show that the cumulative amount of equity issued in Europe during our
sample period is less than e250m, which is significantly less than the typical nominal amount of
an instrument involved in a single (!) LME.14
13Given that Basel II prudential filters applied to total capital, some deductions applied to Tier 1 and Tier 2 on a
50:50 basis.
14Instead, banks predominantly issued non-equity capital instruments to satisfy the 1.5% Additional Tier 1 capital
and 2% Tier 2 capital requirements. For example, in 2011, shortly after the publication of Basel III, Rabobank issued a
Basel III compliant Additional Tier 1 hybrid instrument (Glover, 2011). In 2012, Barclays announced the issuance of
14
Pressure to satisfy the augmented capital requirements originated from regulators. For exam-
ple, the EBA actively managed expectations with respect to the amounts of capital that banks were
expected to report. For the 2011 stress test, the EBA set a Core Tier 1 requirement at 5% of risk-
weighted assets. After this stress test, EBA rapidly raised expectations by setting that ratio to 9%
for the 2012 EBA recapitalization exercise (EBA, 2012). In setting such a high ratio requirement,
the EBA may have responded to the failed 2011 stress test, which did not prevent some banks from
failing shortly after the results were published (Pignal and Jenkins, 2011). For the 2014 EU-wide
stress test, the benchmark was even set at 8% Common Equity Tier 1 using the tighter definition
of capital of Basel III (ECB, 2013).
To sum up: the changes in the regulation that we described above show that even before the en-
try into force of the CRR, regulators actively managed expectations about the quality and quantity
of regulatory capital of European banks. Many European banks hence anticipated the forthcom-
ing rules, either voluntarily or under pressure of their supervisors to meet expectations conveyed
through stress tests and the EBA recapitalization exercise. In particular the EBA recapitalization
exercise in 2012 stood out, because it required banks to meet a demanding capital requirement
(Me´sonnier and Monks, 2014).
B.6. The motivation to execute LMEs.
Instead of issuing new shares to satisfy the elevated Core Tier 1 ratio requirements, banks could
augment their capital of the highest quality in the following three ways: (i) retaining profits, (ii)
selling assets with high risk weights in a process called “de-risking” and (iii) buying back debt
with a low market value in an LME to realize a fair value gain.
The first two options were not always open to all banks. Retaining profits would entail cutting
dividend payments, which would give a bad signal to investors (Lintner, 1956). In addition, retain-
ing profits is only meaningful for profitable banks, as without profits there is not much to retain.
Regarding de-risking, European supervisors actively discouraged banks from selling assets with
an Additional Tier 1 instrument with a trigger that would automatically write down the instrument if the bank’s CET1
ratio were to drop below 7% (Glover, 2012).
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a high risk weight (EBA, 2011b, 2013). Allowing banks to de-risk would lead them to “shrink”
the denominator to increase capital ratios. In practice, this would mean that banks would cut back
on lending to small and medium enterprises, as these are relatively risky borrowers, which in Eu-
rope is a politically sensitive issue (Chassany, Crowley, and Penty, 2012). Given these limitations,
banks sought to increase capital through the execution of LMEs.
B.7. Rules and conventions on LMEs
The quality of capital instruments relies primarily on their loss-absorbing capacity. Banks
should be able to impose losses on these instruments – for example, through a write-down or a
conversion into equity. In addition, banks can impose losses on capital instruments by cancelling
coupon payments on Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments. See Table 1 for an overview of the
requirements for regulatory capital.
The loss-absorbing capacity of capital instruments increases with maturity.15 However, bank
regulation governing the maturity of capital instruments is ambiguous and somewhat inconsistent.
In theory, regulatory capital instruments should be perpetual (or undated) and not callable. This
to make sure the instruments are permanently available to absorb losses. In addition, prudential
regulation prohibits banks from creating any expectations that the instrument will be bought back
(BCBS, 2010; EC, 2006, 2013a). In practice, however, European banks in particular redeem capital
instruments at the first possible call date, which often is five years after issuance. For example,
during the global financial crisis, Deutsche Bank did not honour the call for a Tier 2 instrument,
after which the bank found it difficult and costly to access the market for new issuances of capital
instruments.
Although these calls violate the requirement that capital be permanently available to absorb
losses, they are perfectly legal. The CRD allows banks to call, repurchase or redeem capital instru-
ments after five years [Articles 63a(2) and 64(3) of CRD EC (2006)]. European banks generally
do this, albeit that conditions apply, with stricter conditions applying to Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 in-
15An instrument with a short remaining maturity will be repaid in the foreseeable future. This prevents banks from
imposing losses on that instrument, thus limiting the loss-absorbing capacity of the instrument.
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struments than to Lower Tier 2 instruments. For example, Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments can
only be called with permission of the supervisor if the solvency of the credit institution in question
is not (unduly) affected.16 In practice, this requirement meant that the call should not lead a bank
to violate minimum capital requirements. Many LMEs involved instruments that had not been in
issue for five years. Such buybacks were legal as well, as long as the issuer was sufficiently solvent
and obtained supervisory permission – see for example Article 64(3) of CRD.
Regarding supervisory approval for a buyback, this was necessary, but not always sufficient.
In June 2015, Lloyds Banking Group, for example, found a high court ruling against the bank’s
decision to redeem capital instruments that counted towards its Core Tier 1 capital ratio (Dunkley,
2015a). However, in December, an appeals court quashed this verdict in favor of Lloyds (Dunkley,
2015b). In other words, LMEs are subject to regulatory risk and ambiguity about the interpretation
of applicable terms and conditions.
III. Sample selection and data
We gathered data from European banks over the period April 2009 to December 2013. The
period starts from the April G20 call for capital of higher quality and quantity and ends with the
entry into force of the CRR, the implementation of this G20 call. We exclude Switzerland because
this country is not bound by EU regulation. The reasons to study only EU banks are (i) EU
accounting and prudential rules control the use of the fair value option and require derecognition
of unrealized fair value gains on own credit standing for capital instruments, (ii) the availability of
data: European banks engaged in LMEs much more often than US banks17, and (iii) the quality of
the data, as European LME transactions are all corroborated by the Debt Capital Market desks of
three separate investment banks.
16This last requirement is meant to respect the seniority of Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments in case a bank
is poorly capitalized. Buying these instruments back would impose losses on their holders, whereas the first and
proportionately greatest share of any losses should be imposed on equity holders.
17720 LME transactions from 69 EU banks versus 86 from 37 US banks.
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We analyzed the summary motivations that the investment banks provided us for each transac-
tion to infer the motives to engage in LMEs. From the 613 justifications provided, 506 (82.6%)
indicate that the LME was executed to increase Core Tier 1 capital. The remaining justifications
could not rule out that motive, but were generic (“to manage the capital base of the bank”) or
described the process (“cash tender offer via reverse Dutch auction for up to e150m of its Upper
Tier 2 subordinated callable step up notes”). We therefore are confident that increasing Core Tier 1
was the primary motivation to engage in LMEs.
A. Data levels
We use the data for analyses on different levels. At bank level we compare LME banks against
non-LME banks. This allows us to identify characteristics that may be typical for banks that
execute LMEs. At bank-year level we analyze data of banks that executed LMEs during a fiscal
year. This allows us to estimate the likelihood of an LME during a year.
To examine the consequences of buybacks and which instruments banks targeted, we focus
on the most granular level: the instrument (or contract) level. Here we analyze particulars of
individual instruments that took part in an LME, each of which is governed by a separate contract.
At this level, we focus on LMEs of capital instruments: Tier 1, Upper Tier 2, and Lower Tier 2
instruments. However, to compare these LMEs against those that involved non-capital instruments,
we also include LMEs of senior unsecured debt instruments. These instruments are closest to
capital instruments in ranking and subordination, but not subject to capital adequacy rules.
The three upper panels of Table 2 present an overview of the data at the different levels. Panel A
shows that 69 of the 167 sample banks engaged in LMEs. We can compare characteristics of these
banks to the 98 sample banks that did not engage in LMEs over the sample period. Most banks
that executed LMEs bought back more than one instrument (57 of 69).
[Table 2 about here]
18
During the sample period (from April 1, 2009 to the end of 2013), the sample covers 787 bank-
years, of which 330 (457) are from banks that executed one or more (respectively, zero) LMEs.
Panel B shows that our sample includes 121 (666) bank-years with (without) LMEs.
Panel C reports the number of unique announcement dates as well as, at contract level, the total
number of instruments that were bought back. The sample includes data from 185 announcement
dates. Banks that executed LMEs generally visited the market more than once; they often targeted
multiple instruments in one announcement. A total of 720 instruments was bought back, with
most buybacks involving Tier 1 and Lower Tier 2 instruments, which partly reflects the use of
these instruments by banks.18
B. Sample coverage
We rely on Bankscope and Datastream for consolidated bank data, as each of these databases
offer incomplete and partial coverage of EU banks. The combined data that we use from both
sources covers on average, per year, total bank assets worth e30.6bn, which is 88.3% of total EU
consolidated banking assets reported by the ECB, see Panel D of Table 2.
For items that these databases do not offer, we rely on data from the EBA stress tests and the
EBA recapitalization exercise. In addition, we use data from the ECB on the 2014 asset quality
review. Hand-collected data complement missing EBA and ECB data for the year 2009. Restricting
hand collection of prudential data items to only EBA-covered banks should not lead to a loss of
generalizable inferences, given that EBA bank data cover more than 70% of the EU bank assets.19
Panel E of Table 2 shows that participation in LMEs differs per country. For Denmark, for
example, the sample has observations from 25 banks, of which one engaged in an LME, in 2011.
18It is nearly impossible under Basel II rules to assess details of individual capital instruments that any bank has in
issue. Data kept by data vendors on regulatory capital instruments are often incomplete as banks are not required to
disclose this information.
19The total assets covered by ECB’s asset quality review is over 82%, but it should be noted that the wider scope of
the AQR is mainly the result of the inclusion of subsidiaries of banks covered by the EBA. To prevent double counting
of subsidiary-owned assets, we rely on EBA’s consolidated scope.
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Spain, on the other hand, reports 10 LMEs in 2012, whereas the number of sample banks is compa-
rable to that of Denmark. The sample also reflects differences in market structures across Europe
– with Denmark, France, Italy, Germany and Spain having many banks, and many other countries
having fewer. Luxembourg has a low number of observations, likely because the banks operating
in that country are predominantly subsidiaries of banks from other countries. Finland and Norway
have no LME data.
C. Announcement data
Banks announce an LME generally via a press release. We use the announcement to retrieve the
pre-announcement price. After completion of the exercise, a bank publishes the details: for each
instrument included in the LME the bank publishes the exchange price, notional offered amount,
and notional accepted amount. With this information and the information from the announcement
it is possible to calculate for each instrument included in the LME the buyback premium as well as
the realized fair value gain that the bank then can use to augment equity. This realized gain is the
difference between the nominal value of the underlying exchanged instrument and the associated
paid amount, summed over the instruments involved in an LME.
We measure the cost of the exercise by calculating the difference between the potential fair
value gain that a bank could realize, based on the pre-announcement price of the nominal under-
lying exchanged instruments and the actual gain that the bank realized. This cost is equal to the
buyback premium multiplied by the nominal value exchanged. The larger the buyback premium,
the more the holder of the instrument gains and the less a bank can increase its Core Tier 1 capital
ratio.
IV. Research design and results
A. Characteristics of LMEs
Table 3 presents descriptive evidence on the characteristics of banks that engaged in LMEs
versus those that did not during the sample period.
[Table 3 about here]
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Panel A shows that banks that engaged in LMEs score poorly on many dimensions: profitability,
solvency, regulatory capital ratios and asset quality (measured as non-performing loans over total
loans) for these banks are much lower compared to non-LME banks. Density, measured by the
ratio of risk-weighted assets over total assets and beta, is also high for banks executing an LME –
that is, LME banks appear to have a relatively high risk appetite. The banks that did not engage
in an LME are relatively small compared to LME banks: the average total assets of LME banks is
e326bn, versus e107bn for non-LME banks.
An explanation for why larger banks executed LMEs is that they generally involved complex
hybrid instruments which are subject to extensive regulation. There are economies of scale – for
example, the nominal value of a typical capital instrument ise375m or more. Consequently, larger
banks likely have more instruments in issue at the start of the sample period.20 More importantly,
the capacity needed to manage these instruments implies that larger banks are more successful
in obtaining the required supervisory approval to execute an LME. This is in line with Ioannidou
(2005), who shows that larger banks are less likely the subject of formal supervisory intervention.
Panel B of Table 3 reports dividend pay-out statistics of 121 bank-year observations with, and
666 bank-year observations without LMEs. Banks that engaged in LMEs have higher pay-out
ratios than non-LME banks in the year before the LME (44.9% versus 25.9%) and in the year of
the LME (39.4% versus 23.5%). There is a drop in pay-out ratio after an LME, from 44.9% to
39.4%, however this drop is insignificant (untabulated p-value of 0.37). This suggests that banks
generally avoid cutting dividends and revert to other (less efficient) ways of increasing capital.
B. The Buyback premium
The buyback premium is of particular prudential interest, as it reflects a loss of cash – which
affects liquidity and solvency. The premium arises because banks generally operate at high levels
of leverage. When leverage is very high, the prospect of bankruptcy will negatively affect the value
of the bank, its debt and equity.
20See footnote 18.
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One way to deleverage is by buying back debt. In particular, poorly performing banks and
banks with poor solvency ratios may choose to buy back debt given that alternatives may not work
in practice: equity investors have no appetite to buy shares, retaining profits may be problem-
atic if profitability is low, and selling assets, especially in illiquid markets, may be cumbersome,
politically sensitive or subject to supervisory approval.
An important consequence of a debt buyback is that the overall value of debt of a bank in-
creases. Therefore, an investor who is willing to sell a debt instrument back to the bank faces a
free-rider problem: other debt holders benefit from the investor’s willingness to sell his instrument
back to the bank. Consequently, the investor will only participate in a buyback transaction if he
receives a premium. Bulow and Rogoff (1988) and Admati et al. (2015) predict that the investor
will only participate in a buyback transaction if he receives a premium that increases the price to
the value after the buyback.
Merton (1974) allows us to illustrate why debt holders would command a premium for selling
their instrument back to a bank by demonstrating that the value of debt (D) can be expressed as
(1) D = AN(−d1)+Ke−rtN(d2),
where A is the asset value of the bank, K the face value of debt, r the risk-free rate, and t the
duration of debt. N(d) is the probability that a standard normal random variable will be less than
or equal to d:
d1 =
ln( AK )+(r+σ
2/2)t
σ
√
t
d2 = d1−σ
√
t.(2)
Dividing Equation (1) by the face value of debt (K) allows us to show the effect of deleveraging,
see Figure 1. The graph in Figure 1 shows that debt reduction (a move along the graph to the right)
leads to an increase in the value of the remaining debt relative to its face value. This constitutes a
wealth transfer form shareholders to debt holders.
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[Figure 1 about here]
In addition, according to Admati et al. (2015), holders of bank debt will command a premium
(pi) to part from their instrument, where pi = PX −PA. The PX is the exchange price paid for the
bought-back instrument, PA is its fair value before the buyback announcement. Holders of debt
instruments will therefore command a buyback premium that varies inversely with solvency.
Following the discussion on regulation in Section B, banks may predominantly focus their
LME efforts on debt instruments that count towards regulatory capital. The accounting rules and
prudential regulation jointly work in such a way that, irrespective of the way they are accounted
for, gains on these instruments can be realized only through a buyback. We also expect banks
to opportunistically exploit the unpredictability of a buyback. Regulatory capital instruments are
meant to be permanently available to absorb losses. The prospect of having to absorb losses should
therefore contribute to the depth of the discount and the related potential fair value gain in a LME.
However, the discount and the related gain would disappear if investors anticipated a buyback.
A successful LME should therefore have an element of surprise. Thanks to the rule on buybacks
that grant the initiative of a buyback to the issuer, banks were able to choose instruments with the
deepest discounts. These were generally instruments that are least likely to be bought back – for
example, instruments that are subject to more onerous buyback requirements, such as instruments
that require permission and for which permission may perhaps not be granted, or instruments that
were in issue less than five years.
We therefore expect permanent capital instruments (Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments) to
show a larger discount and potential fair value gain than Lower Tier 2 instruments or senior un-
secured debt. This is primarily because Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments are subject to re-
quirements that make them more loss-absorbing than other instruments (see Table 1). In addition,
these instruments are also the ones that investors may not expect to be bought back, given the more
onerous buyback requirements. Moreover, Admati et al. (2015) offer theoretical support for the
idea that banks prefer to buy back the most junior instruments.
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Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of the buyback premium, as well as the associated costs,
gains and inefficiencies of LMEs. Panel A shows the distribution of the buyback premium for
banks that engaged in an LME. The mean premium is relatively high when compared to other
research. De Jong et al. (2009), for a wide sample of EU banks before the global financial crisis,
for example, report an average (median) premium of 3.9% (1.2%) whereas we find an average
(median) premium of 8.22% (5.06%). Mann and Powers (2007) report average (median) premiums
of 5.55% (3.24%). A possible explanation for these differences is that our sample contains only
banks, which are highly levered and for which buybacks are subject to supervisory permission.
In addition, our sample period is situated after the onset of the financial crisis, which may have
deepened the discounts.
[Table 4 about here]
The average potential fair value gain that a bank could realize in an LME is 20.0 bp of total assets
(29.2 bp of risk-weighted assets). The average actual, or realized, gain however, is substantially
lower: 14.3 bp of total assets (21.8 bp of risk-weighted assets). These gains may appear limited,
however, when expressed in relation to equity, they are substantial: the mean (median) realized
gain is 390 bp (97.4 bp).
The difference between potential and actual gains on LMEs reveal their cost. Although these
costs are limited in comparison to total assets (5.66 bp on average), their effect on equity can be
substantial: the mean (median) cost of a LME on equity holders is 115 bp (48.9 bp). However,
their effect at the 99th percentile can be significantly larger: 1,355 bp.
Panel B shows the buyback premium as a percentage of the par value of the exchanged instru-
ment by regulatory classification. It shows that holders of permanent instruments, namely Tier 1
and Upper Tier 2 instruments, command a higher buyback premium (11.32% and 9.87%) than
holders of Lower Tier 2 instruments (5.59%) and non-regulatory instruments (2.48%). The dif-
ferences in the premiums between regulatory classifications are also significantly different from
zero, except for the difference in the premiums paid for Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments (p-
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value = 0.19). The next column in Panel B shows the amounts offered per instrument, which are
comparable for capital instruments, but about twice as large for unsecured debt instruments.
Panel B also shows the inefficiency of LMEs. For example, the average Upper Tier 2 instru-
ment would, in the absence of an LME, offer a 41.8% unrealized fair value gain. However, this is
deceptive: the average realized gain is only 31.9% (41.8%− 9.87%) as part of the potential gain
(the premium) is transfered to the holders of the bought-back instruments. The rightmost column
of Panel B measures this inefficiency. It measures which part of the potential buyback premium
accrues to debt holders. The column shows that LMEs that involve the most loss-absorbing instru-
ments are the least cash conserving: About a quarter of the potential fair value gain goes to the
debt holders. The transfer is lower for less loss-absorbing instruments.
The lower part of Panel B shows the mean amount exchanged per instrument as well as the loss
of regulatory capital per exchanged instrument (in italics). The amounts are smaller for capital
instruments than for unsecured debt. Note that not all instruments offered are exchanged: the
success rate of an LME is about 53%.
Table 5 shows a breakdown of the premiums as well as the amounts involved per year and per
country. The premiums vary by year, with 2009 (2010) reporting the highest (lowest) premiums.
The observations of 2009 may reflect lingering uncertainty during the post-Lehman collapse period
as untabulated results show a drop in premiums, from 11.9% for the first half of 2009 to 8.36%
for the second half of 2009. The low premiums in 2010 coincide with a low number of exercises.
The potential fair value gain of the LMEs reaches a total of e41.6bn. This is significant and in the
absence of the recognition ban, it would contribute to improving the capital positions of EU banks.
[Table 5 about here]
Panel A of Table 5 also shows that the actual, or realized, gains on LMEs are significantly lower
than the potential gain. The difference is e9.1bn, which is about 22% of the potential fair value
gain. In the absence of the derecognition rule, this amount could have been used to augment Core
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Tier 1 equity. To put the amount of e9.1bn in perspective, it is 35% of the reported total capital
shortfall of e25bn that the ECB reported for the 2014 EU asset quality review (ECB, 2014).
In addition, panel A shows that in 2011 and 2012, the years of the controversial EBA stress test
and the EBA recapitalization exercise, banks executed more LMEs than in other years. In these
two years, banks offered a total nominal amount of e162.2bn, about 64% of the sample total. In
the other years, banks offered significantly less. The number of banks engaging in LMEs is also
high for these two years: 36 (2011) and 51 (2012), where in other years this number ranges from
13 to 25. The effect of the LMEs on total EU regulatory capital is a reduction of e110.9bn, with
the largest reductions taking place in 2011 and 2012.
Lastly, the penultimate row of panel A shows that the number of LMEs dropped in 2013. The
mean premium value for this year is high due to the premium paid by the Eurobank of Greece.
Excluding this bank would lead the mean premium value to drop to 3%, which helps explain the
decrease in activity for 2013: the gains to be made in an LME dropped.
Panel B of Table 5 shows the transactions per country. France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK
were particularly active regarding LMEs. The countries with the lowest efficiency were Portugal
and Spain, with Spanish banks transferring 48.2% of the potential fair value gains to debt instru-
ment holders. Cyprus and Ireland show a low discrepancy between potential and actual gains, as
banks in these countries were obliged to impose losses on debt holders.
In this section, we presented descriptive evidence on the characteristics of banks that engaged in
LMEs versus those that did not and on the inefficiency of LMEs. In the next section we investigate
more formally the determinants of an LME using a multivariate regression model.
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C. The likelihood of an LME
At bank level, we model the likelihood of an LME using the following probit model, hencefor-
ward referred to as the LME model:
LME[0,1] =β0+β1Solvency+β2Size+β3Pay-out+β4ROA+
β5GIIPS+β6Listed+
8
∑
n=7
βnBusiness model+ ε(3)
where LME is equal to 1 if a bank engages in an LME in a fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.
Solvency is either Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets (SolvTier 1) or accounting eq-
uity divided by total assets (SolvEquity). Size is the natural log of total assets in millions of euros.
Pay-out is dividend as a proportion of net income. ROA is net income over total assets. GIIPS is
an indicator for LMEs from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Listed indicates whether
the bank is listed on a stock exchange. Business model is indicator variable for the following bank
types: “retail-funded” or “trading” based on the average values for gross loans and interbank bor-
rowing. Except for GIIPS, the regressors are lagged variables to respect the order of causality. The
regression model relies on p-values that account for two-dimensional within-cluster correlation
(Petersen, 2009).
We expect the coefficient on Solvency to be negative and the coefficient on Size to be positive.
We control for dividend Pay-out as it may be associated with the probability of an LME for two
reasons. First, dividends are sticky over time (Lintner, 1956). Therefore banks may choose to
continue paying dividends, even if this is at the expense of retained earnings and additions to
Core Tier 1 capital. Ceteris paribus, a dividend-paying bank will need to replenish equity capital
sooner than a bank that does not pay dividends. Second, by paying debt holders a premium, banks
that engage in LMEs give their non-equity capital instrument holders a preferential treatment over
equity holders. To prevent unequal treatment of investors, debt contracts often contain clauses that
are referred to as “pushers” and “stoppers”. A dividend pusher ensures that instrument holders
receive their coupon if a bank pays dividends. A dividend stopper prevents a bank from paying
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dividends if it decides to cancel a coupon payment. The buyback of a debt instrument may therefore
prompt a bank to continue paying dividends.
We control for profitability (ROA), of which the coefficient should be negative, as low prof-
itability limits a bank that wishes to increase retained earnings and capital. We use an indicator
variable to control for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS). These countries were
singled out as risky debtor countries during our sample period, and are therefore potentially less
able to guarantee their national banks. This implies an expected positive coefficient on this indi-
cator variable. We apply an additional control for listing status, as listed banks may operate in a
different disclosure environment and may be subjected to different regulations – for example, Mi-
FID (Directive 2004/39/EC) and exchange listing rules. Lastly, we control for a possible business
model effect, as banks may issue debt instruments to distinct investor classes. For this control, we
rely on Roengpitya, Tarashev, and Tsatsaronis (2014), who classify European banks into distinct
business models. We use separate indicators for retail-funded banks and for trading banks.
Table 6 shows the correlation matrix for the main regression variables. This table shows that the
occurrence of an LME in a year negatively correlates with solvency and profitability, and positively
with the other variables. The correlations are broadly consistent with our expectations.
[Table 6 about here]
Table 7 presents the results of the LME model. The dependent variable of the probit model is 1 if
a bank engages in an LME during a fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. Note that except for GIIPS, all
regressors are lagged.
[Table 7 about here]
The coefficients on Solvency are negative and significant, as expected: −5.55 for accounting sol-
vency and −6.88 for regulatory solvency, both with p-values of 0.00. The likelihood of an LME
thus increases as banks’ solvency decreases. The coefficient on Size is, as expected, positive and
significant. The coefficient on dividend pay-out is positive, and the coefficient on ROA negative.
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These two coefficient values are as expected, albeit that the latter is not significant. Next, we find
that banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain are more likely to execute an LME, as well
as listed banks and banks that adopted a trading or a retail-funded business model.
Overall, the results of Table 7 show that the likelihood of an LME increases with leverage
and size. The LME model thus shows that poorly capitalized banks engaged in LMEs, which is
consistent with the idea that the unrealized fair value gain on a debt instrument incentivizes banks
to buy them back, and inconsistent with prudential rules that prevent poorly capitalized banks from
buying back capital instruments. The positive coefficients on size are in line with Ioannidou (2005)
and likely reflect bargaining power or economies of scale, as larger banks were in a better position
to manage the instruments that they chose to issue and later buy back.
Other factors that increase the likelihood of an LME are location in one of the GIIPS countries,
which likely reflects a higher perceived risk of bank failure. Again other factors are listing status
and the business model, which may reflect, among other things, the investor base of hybrid capital
instrument holders. Note that EU regulations such as IFRS and CRR do not cater to specific
business models or countries, which renders a closer examination of these factors less relevant.
Hence our decision to not examine these factors more closely.
D. Determinants of the buyback premium
The main variable of interest in the second stage of the analysis is the buyback premium. This
is the difference between the buyback price and the value of the instrument before the buyback
announcement:
(4) pi = PX −PA,
where PX is the exchange price of the instrument expressed as a percentage of the nominal value
of the instrument and PA is the pre-announcement price of the instrument, also expressed as a
percentage of the nominal value of the instrument (PN). Instruments that are bought back in an
LME generally trade below par at the announcement date (PA < PN). The exchange price should
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therefore be higher than the price at the announcement and lower than the nominal value: PA <
PX < PN .
The reason we focus on the buyback premium is because it is the part of the regulated fair
value gain that the bank loses in an LME. It is the manifestation of the ban on the recognition of
unrealized gains and losses originating from changes in own credit standing.
The Premium model below allows us to examine the factors that affect the buyback premium
for individual bought-back instruments:
pi=β0+β1Tier 1+β2Upper Tier 2+β3Lower Tier 2+β4V IX +β5Solvency+
β6Size+β7EBA Recap+β8Mills′+ ε(5)
where pi is the buyback premium for each individual bought-back instrument, expressed as a per-
centage of the nominal underlying value of the instrument, or the inverse hyperbolic sine of the
premium: sinh−1pi. The latter is a log transformation of the premium that is not restricted to only
positive values.
Tier 1 is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the bought-back instrument counted towards
Tier 1 capital, and zero otherwise. Likewise, Upper (Lower) Tier 2 is an indicator variable for
an Upper (Lower) Tier 2 instrument, where Table 1 shows the loss-absorbing capacity of these
instruments. As the sample used for the regressions contains transactions where the exchanged
instrument is a regulatory capital instrument or an unsecured debt instrument, the coefficient val-
ues for Tier 1, Upper Tier 2 and Lower Tier 2 are relative to those of unsecured debt instruments.
As explained, we expect the coefficients on Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments to be positive
and higher than the coefficient on Lower Tier 2 instruments because Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 in-
struments are meant to be more loss-absorbent, and their buybacks are subjected to stricter rules.
Solvency is either accounting equity divided by total assets (SolvEquity) or Core Tier 1 capital di-
vided by risk-weighted assets (SolvCoreTier 1), where Core Tier 1 capital is Tier 1 capital net of
hybrid Tier 1 capital instruments. We expect the coefficient for Solvency to be negative.
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Given that this analysis uses intra-year data, we now include the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX)
and EBA recapitalization exercise in this model. VIX is the closing value of the CBOE Volatility
Index, standardized to values between 0 and 1. We expect the CBOE Volatility Index to be posi-
tively associated with the buyback premium, given that worse financial conditions are associated
with higher correlations, higher volatilities, and higher spreads (Schwert, 2011; Opschoor, van
Dijk, and van der Wel, 2014). EBA Recap is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for repurchases
that took place from September to December 7, 2011, the time before the EBA announced the
recapitalization exercise results (EBA, 2011a). The response to the EBA recapitalization exercise,
which required banks to meet a fairly demanding capital requirement of 9% Core Tier 1, may have
prompted banks without excess capital to announce an LME, which would imply a positive coef-
ficient on this indicator variable. On the other hand, buybacks in these months may have alerted
investors, who then may have responded by buying hybrid capital instruments in anticipation of
an LME, which would imply a negative coefficient on the indicator. As a result, we have no ex-
pectations on this indicator variable. Next, we control for the size of banks, where expect to find
a negative coefficient. We include the inverse Mills ratio, obtained from the results of the LME
model, to control for selection bias.
Table 8 presents the correlations between the variables included in the buyback premium
model.21 The table shows that the buyback premium correlates positively with the most loss-
absorbing instruments (Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2), the CBOE Volatility Index, and the EBA re-
capitalization exercise, albeit that the latter correlation is weak. The other correlation coefficients
are negative, in particular the coefficients on solvency and size. Table 8 thus shows that most
correlation coefficients are as expected.
[Table 8 about here]
The high and negative correlation coefficient between Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 appears to indicate
that these two instruments are substitutes and more similar to each other than to Lower Tier 2 in-
21The variables in the last five rows will be discussed in Table 10 below.
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struments. The other high correlation coefficient is the one between the CBOE Volatility Index and
the EBA recapitalization exercise, which may induce some multicollinearity problems going for-
ward.22
Table 9 shows the results of the buyback premium model. The first column presents the base-
line regression results only, with minimal overlap of variables included in the LME model. Sub-
sequent columns include also size and solvency. The coefficients on the capital instruments are all
positive and significant, which confirms that investors command a premium for redeeming capital
instruments. The coefficients are significant for all three types of instruments: for Tier 1 hybrids
the coefficient value is 1.46, for Upper Tier 2 instruments it is 1.13, and for Lower Tier 2 instru-
ments it is 0.88, all with p-values of 0.00. As expected, the coefficient on VIX is positive and
significant (2.47, p-value of 0.00). The coefficients on the two solvency variables are negative and
significant: −10.1 (p = 0.00) for the coefficient on accounting solvency and −11.2 (p = 0.00) for
Core Tier 1 ratio. These results confirm our expectation that less resilient banks pay higher pre-
miums to make investors part from their instruments. The coefficient on size is also consistently
negative: larger banks pay a lower premium, a result that can be attributed to either a better infor-
mation environment or lower risk. Lastly, the coefficient on the EBA recapitalization exercise is
negative throughout, though not always significant. This coefficient value is consistent with the
interpretation that the EBA recapitalization exercise may have contributed to the information en-
vironment, and not consistent with the notion that the exercise forced banks to reveal more about
their true solvency position than the two other measures of solvency did.
[Table 9 about here]
Moving to the last four columns, these present the coefficients of a linear regression model with
the buyback premium (pi) as dependent variable. These coefficients facilitate an assessment of the
22Note that, although Table 8 shows a high correlation between CBOE Volatility Index and the EBA recapitalization
exercise, the variance inflation factors for these two variables are low (2.01 and 1.98) and for all variables they are
well below 10. Therefore, multicollinearity is unlikely to affect the coefficient estimates.
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economic significance of the results. For example, the coefficient values on Tier 1 show that these
instruments require a 6–10% higher premium than senior unsecured instruments. The coefficient
values on solvency indicate that a drop of the solvency ratio by 1% point increases the buyback
premium by 34 to 63%, which is economically significant. The coefficient on VIX has the potential
to increase the premium by at least 10%, which too is economically significant. Although the co-
efficient values on Upper Tier 2 instruments are higher than the coefficients on Tier 1 instruments,
the probabilities shown in the row below the intercept values indicate that we cannot reject the
hypothesis that these coefficients are equal.
The results reported in Table 9 confirm our expectations that the buyback premiums paid in
LMEs (i) increase with the loss-absorbing capacity of bought back instruments, (ii) increase with
economy-wide financial stress measured by the VIX, (iii) decrease with solvency, and (iv) decrease
with bank size. The results are relevant – for example, the results on loss-absorbing capacity and
solvency reveal unintended consequences of the requirement to derecognize fair value gains on
debt instruments that are due to a change in credit standing. The results on VIX show that super-
visors’ decisions to require banks to recapitalize in times of economic stress may have unintended
consequences. On the other hand, the results on the EBA recapitalization exercise show that a
coordinated recapitalization exercise may mitigate the adverse effects of LMEs.
E. Determinants of instruments that banks target
The models above do not distinguish between the types of instruments that banks bought back.
To investigate whether banks use their discretion to target specific instruments, we run an ordered
probit model at instrument level:
T[1..4] =β0+β1Solvency+β2Discount+β3VIX+β4Size+β5Pay-out+β6ROA+β7GIIPS+
β8EBA Recap+β9Listed+
11
∑
n=10
βnBusiness model+β12Mills′+ ε(6)
where the dependent variable (T ) is a categorical variable that increases with the loss-absorbing
quality of the instrument. Its value is “4” for an LME involving a Tier 1 instrument, “3” for an
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Upper Tier 2 instrument, “2” for a Lower Tier 2 instrument, and “1” for senior unsecured. Discount
is 1 minus the pre-announcement price expressed as a fraction of the face value of the bought-back
instrument: 1−PA. We include this variable as it is likely positively related to the loss-absorbing
quality of the bought-back instrument. All other variables are as defined previously.
[Table 10 about here]
Consistent with our expectations, the correlations shown in the lower rows of Table 8, and with
Admati et al. (2015), we find that a lower solvency increases the likelihood of the repurchase of
a more loss-absorbing instrument. The discount variable also confirms expectations, with deeper
discounts for more loss-absorbing instruments. Likewise, the coefficient on VIX shows that banks
target more loss-absorbing instruments in times of higher economic uncertainty. The positive size
coefficient likely indicates that larger banks may have more Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments
in issue. The positive coefficient on ROA is likely a reflection of the supervisory approval process.
Holding other factors constant, supervisors may grant permission earlier when the prospects of the
bank look good.
F. Cumulative abnormal announcement returns
We focused on the buyback premium because of its prudential relevance: the premium is a
transfer of cash from the owners of the bank to its debt holders, which weakens a bank’s resilience.
However, Admati et al. (2015) and Merton (1974) offer a motivation to examine equity investors’
responses as well. Where Admati et al. claim that benefits of deleveraging accrue to debt holders,
Merton offers a more moderate view: equity holders may benefit from deleveraging as well – that
is, it is unclear what to expect empirically. We therefore examine the effect of solvency on equity
investors’ responses to LME announcements.
Table 11 reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around 90 LME announcements over
our sample period. The CARs rely on the market model using the Datastream European market
index, estimated over days −250 to −50 before the announcement. We chose a 10-day return
window given that it takes time before investors learn the full outcome of an LME, which is not
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unreasonable given an LME success rate of 53%. In the case of the Cre´dit Agricole example
that featured in the introduction, it took a week before investors learned about the success of the
announced LME. In fact, the announcement of a LME triggers an initial positive response from
investors, see for example the LME announced by Deutsche Bank in February 2016 (Shotter,
Jenkins, and Jackson, 2016). However, our sample data shows that the initial positive response
turns into a negative one as time progresses.
We control for the following factors: (i) the realized loss that an LME imposes on equity
investors (i.e., the aggregate buyback premium relative to equity), (ii) an indicator for permanent
capital instruments, (iii) size, (iv) ROA and (v) relative offer size: the aggregate LME offer amount
scaled by total assets size. The variables are aggregated over the number of instruments involved
in an LME – that is, for each LME announcement.
[Table 11 about here]
Table 11 shows that LMEs have a negative effect on share prices. With CARs down by more
than 2%, LMEs are bad news for equity investors. The regression results also confirm our earlier
findings. They show a negative relation between bank solvency and cumulative abnormal returns,
which is what one would expect: the less leveraged a bank is, the less equity investors benefit from
deleveraging, and the more the LME is a transfer of wealth from debt holders at the expense of
equity holders. The results also show a strong negative response to the realized losses that an LME
imposes on equity holders, again a result that one should expect.
The control variables show that, holding other factors constant, an LME is bad news for smaller
banks, whereas CARs increase with return on assets, and with the relative offer size. Closer inspec-
tion shows that this last result is driven by senior unsecured debt LMEs, for which the premiums
are low.
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G. Additional tests
G.1. LME success rate
Not all invitations to offer an instrument succeed in full – the success rate is 53%. We exam-
ined the effects the success rate, but we found no result of this examinations that would alter our
inferences.
G.2. LME success rate and Cash LMEs versus exchanges
About a third of the LMEs are exchanges, where a bank replaces an existing instrument by a
new instrument at new terms. Results of this examination do not alter our inferences either.
G.3. IFRS
It is unlikely that the application of IFRS affects our results, as from 2007 on, the EU imple-
mentation of IFRS requires firms whose debt securities are admitted on a regulated market of any
Member State to apply IFRS EC (2002).
V. Conclusion
European bank regulation requires banks to derecognize, for the calculation of regulatory cap-
ital ratios, any unrealized gains or losses on their liabilities valued at fair value that are due to
changes in their own credit standing. This is to safeguard the safety and soundness of the banking
system. In the lead-up to the implementation of Basel III, European banks circumvented this dere-
cognition requirement by repurchasing instruments which traded at a discount from their holders in
Liability Management Exercises (LMEs). The majority of LMEs involved hybrid debt instruments
that counted as regulatory bank capital. These instruments were bought back, after which the gain,
net of the buyback premium, contributed to the formation of additional Core Tier 1 capital.
The results of our analyses of the likelihood of an LME show that it decreases with a bank’s
solvency but increases with size. We also document that banks from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal
and Spain, and listed banks are more likely to engage in LMEs. The likelihood decreases with
profitability and increases with the dividend pay-out ratio.
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The results of our analyses of the premium that banks pay to an investor to part from his
instrument confirm that it increases with (i) the loss-absorbing capacity of capital instruments,
(ii) economy-wide financial stress measured by the CBOE Volatility Index, and (iii) solvency. The
buyback premiums are at the expense of banks’ liquidity and banks’ overall regulatory capital
position. In addition, the buyback benefits debt holders at the expense of equity holders. The
total buyback premium that the sample banks paid amounts to e9.1bn, this out of a potential fair
value gain of e41.6bn that banks could recognize and add to Core Tier 1 capital if prudential rules
allowed them to do so. The increase of e32.4bn in Core Tier 1 capital is offset by an overall
reduction in total regulatory capital of e110.9bn.
Results of our examination of instruments that banks target for a repurchase show that the
likelihood that a bank buys back more loss-absorbing instruments increases with leverage and
economy-wide financial stress. Lastly, we also document an unfavorable response from investors
when banks announce an LME, and the response worsens with solvency. Investors penalize healthy
banks for engaging in an LME.
Altogether, these results show that the requirement to derecognize fair value gains on debt
has important unintended consequences. For example, prudential rules should prevent banks from
buying back the most loss-absorbing instruments. But our results show that these instruments
are the most attractive buyback targets. In addition, regulation allows buybacks of the most loss-
absorbing instruments only if a bank is sufficiently solvent. However, our results show that the
least solvent banks engaged in LMEs. Our results also show that the incentive to engage in an
LME increases in times of economic stress.
These results have several policy implications: contrary to the objectives of bank solvency
rules, the ban on recognizing unrealized fair value gains on debt instruments may not help the safety
and soundness of the banking system. In a context of economic uncertainty, poorly capitalized
banks, for which cash conservation is paramount, engaged in the least efficient and least cash
conserving LMEs. This is precisely opposite to what the prudential filter aims to achieve.
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Returning to the question in the title of this paper, the answer is affirmative: below-par own debt
repurchases should be a cause for prudential concern. Contrary to their expectations, regulators’
main concern should be the effectiveness of regulation. Banks will circumvent the prudential filter
on recognizing unrealized gains originating from a weakened own credit standing by engaging in
LMEs. In particular the least resilient banks will engage in LMEs when they are most vulnerable.
These banks would benefit from having their debt fair valued to preserve liquidity and solvency.
Therefore, our results weaken the case of the exclusion of unrealized gains and losses that originate
from changes in own credit standing in the calculation of regulatory capital.
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Figure 1: The value of debt: the g0.8ph follows the function
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, A is total assets, K the face value of debt as a fraction
of total assets times 100, r the risk-free rate, and t the duration of debt. N(d) is the probability
that a standard normal random variable will be less than or equal to d. The figure assumes the
following parameter values: t is 2.5 years – assuming average maturity of a 5-year Tier 2 hybrid
capital security. The risk-free rate: r = 1.0%, annual standard deviation σ= 20.0%.
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TABLE 1
Regulatory capital and loss-absorbing capacity
The table outlines the loss-absorbing capacity of capital instruments, with the most loss-absorbing items at the top. The descriptions follow capital
definitions of Basel II (BCBS, 2006a), the Basel press release on instruments eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital (BCBS, 1998), CRD (EC, 2006),
Basel III (BCBS, 2010, 2011), and CRR (EC, 2013a). CRR (Europe’s Basel III implementation) entered into force on January 1, 2014. Tier 1
hybrid and Additional Tier 1 instruments are senior in ranking to common stock and rank junior to depositors, general creditors and subordinated
debt of the bank. Upper Tier 2 instruments are undated, permanent instruments that are subordinated in full to non-subordinated creditors. Lower
Tier 2 instruments are dated instruments of which the principal is subordinated to non-subordinated creditors. Tier 2 (Basel III) instruments are
subordinated to depositors and general creditors of the bank. RWA is risk-weighted assets.
Basel II and CRD Item Maturity Remarks Requirement
Capital of highest quality (book
equity after deductions)
Core Tier 1 Cannot be repaid
outside liquidation
⇒
L
ess
loss
absorbing
Tier 1 + Tier 2 ≤8%
of RWA
> 12 of Tier 1 ⇐
Subordination
Hybrid instruments1,2 Tier 1 hybrids Permanent, perpet-
ual
Coupon and instru-
ment should absorb
losses in going con-
cern
≤ 12 of Tier 1
Subordinated debt instruments1,2 Upper Tier 2 Permanent, no ma-
turity
Coupon and instru-
ment should absorb
losses in going con-
cern
Tier 2 ≤ Tier 1
Subordinated debt instruments1 Lower Tier 2 Maturity ≥ 5 years
and then a 5-year
gradual capital dere-
cognition period
≤ 12 of Tier 1
Senior unsecured debt Buyback without
permission
Basel III and CRR Item Maturity Remarks Requirement
Capital of highest quality Common equity
Tier 1 (CET1)
Cannot be repaid
outside liquidation
⇒
L
ess
loss
absorbing
≥ 4.5% + buffers up
to 10% of RWA
⇐
Subordination
Hybrid instruments1,3 Additional Tier 1
(AT1)
Permanent, perpet-
ual, preferential
Subordinated to
Tier 2; coupon may
be cancelled
≥ 1.5% of RWA
Subordinated debt instruments1,3 Tier 2 Maturity ≥ 5 years
and then a 5-year
linear capital dere-
cognition period
≥ 2% of RWA
Senior unsecured debt Buyback without
permission
1 These instruments are callable at the initiative of the issuer after a minimum of five years.
2 Except for Lower Tier 2 instruments, calls and buybacks (i) need supervisory approval, (ii) are allowed if the financial and solvency conditions
of the institution are not (unduly) affected (EC, 2006).
3 Under Basel III rules and under the EU bank recovery and resolution directive, all instruments shall be written off or converted into equity
at the point that the viability of the bank is at risk (BCBS, 2011; EC, 2014). The CRR allows calling the instrument before maturity after prior
supervisory approval and if the bank replaces the called instrument by an instrument of equal or higher quality at terms that are sustainable for the
income capacity of the institution; or the bank demonstrates that its capital position is well above the minimum capital requirements after the call
option is exercised.
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TABLE 2
Sample coverage
The table describes the sample, which covers the period April 2009 to December 2013. Panel A reports observations of European banks that
executed one or more LMEs during the sample period and those that did not execute an LME during the sample period. Panel B focuses on banks-
years only. Panel C reports the number of instruments that were involved in LMEs – each number represents a contract governing an instrument.
Panel D shows the coverage of the sample banks measured by consolidated total assets, compared to the total assets of consolidated banking data
reported by the ECB. Panel E reports bank-years. Of the column pairs, the left-hand number shows bank-years in which a bank did execute a LME;
the right-hand number shows sample bank years.
Panel A: Bank level Banks Bank-years
Total 167 787
Banks executing an LME during 2009–2013 69 330
Of which, banks with
a single LME (12)
more than one LME (57)
Banks that did not execute an LME over the sample period 98 457
Panel B: Bank-year level Bank-years
All bank-years 787
Of which, bank-years with LMEs 121
no LME 666
Panel C: Instrument level Announcement Instruments,
dates Contracts
Total 185 720
Of which Tier 1 97 280
Upper Tier 2 50 97
Lower Tier 2 92 302
Unsecured debt 11 41
Panel D: Total bank assets Average 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
Sample 30.6 29.4 32.6 33.0 31.4 26.5
ECB 34.7 32.4 35.5 35.9 34.6 34.8
Coverage (%) 88.3 90.7 91.9 91.8 90.7 76.2
Panel E: Bank-years with, without LMEs 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
Austria 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Belgium 4 2 4 4 4 1 4
Cyprus 3 1 3 3 3 3
Denmark 24 25 1 25 25 25
Finland 1 1 1 1 1
France 21 5 21 3 21 21 2 21
Germany 14 14 1 15 15 15
Greece 4 7 4 8 8 9 1 9
Ireland 2 3 3 3 2 4 3 4
Italy 3 19 7 20 4 19 1 19 2 19
Luxembourg 1 2 2 2 1 1
Netherlands 1 7 1 7 4 7 1 7 2 7
Norway 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 5 1 5 4 5 5 4
Slovenia 2 2 4 4 4 4
Spain 1 19 10 19 6 26 4 25 5 20
Sweden 4 4 4 4 1 4
United Kingdom 4 13 7 13 5 13 4 13 4 11
Total 15 150 42 156 31 163 12 163 21 155
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TABLE 3
Characteristics of sample banks 2009–2013
The table reports descriptive statistics, separately for European banks that did (and did not) engage in LMEs, over the period April 2009–December
2013. Ever LME (Never LME) denotes banks that (did not) engage in LMEs. The table reports 330 bank-year observations from 69 banks with, and
457 bank-year observations from 98 banks without LMEs. p1, p5, p25, p50, p75, p95, p99 indicate percentile values for percentiles 1, 5, 25, 75, 95,
and 99 and the median (p50). p (diff) indicates the significance of the differences in means of variables reported in the upper and lower part of each
panel. Net income is the income the bank realized over the fiscal year. ROA is net income over average total assets. Solvency is lagged accounting
equity divided by lagged total assets. Tier 1 ratio is the lagged Tier 1 capital ratio. AQ is the asset quality of the bank, measured as the loan loss
provision over the amount of net loans. Density is the lagged ratio of risk-weighted assets over total assets. Beta is a bank’s stock beta, estimated
using 60 monthly observations of bank returns and the Datastream EU market index. Equity is common shareholders’ equity. Total assets is the book
value of total assets. Pay-out is the dividend pay-out ratio.
Panel A: Ever LME (no. of obs: 330)
Means p (diff) p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
Net income (Me) −92.2 0.01 −10,811 −4,211 −461 82.0 640 3,590 6,271
ROA (%) −0.53 0.00 −11.0 −4.22 −0.47 0.15 0.35 0.83 2.99
Solvency (%) 5.30 0.00 0.00 0.80 3.50 5.10 6.50 10.1 17.0
Tier 1 ratio (% of RWA) 10.3 0.00 0.00 6.65 8.30 10.1 12.5 15.5 18.3
AQ (%) 1.58 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.45 0.95 1.67 4.90 11.5
Density ( RWATA ) (%) 49.7 0.04 19.7 23.7 33.5 49.5 61.2 82.7 91.3
Beta 0.98 0.00 0.24 0.33 0.76 0.92 1.25 1.55 1.90
BIS ratio (%) 12.8 0.00 0.20 9.32 11.0 12.8 14.4 17.1 19.0
Equity (Me) 14,760 0.00 −2,463 320 1,748 5,971 17,440 66,308 85,886
Total assets (Me) 325,947 0.00 2,677 10,499 42,147 110,742 399,220 1,550,903 1,899,419
Never LME (no. of obs: 457)
Means p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
Net income (Me) 263 −1,800 −299 1.33 31.2 203 2,310 4,973
ROA (%) −0.02 −10.4 −2.60 0.08 0.32 0.70 1.27 3.22
Solvency (%) 8.80 0.00 2.10 4.60 7.30 11.0 17.0 58.8
Tier 1 ratio (% of RWA) 11.9 4.00 4.00 8.85 11.2 14.5 19.9 25.3
AQ (%) 1.42 0.00 0.01 0.28 0.70 1.68 4.64 11.4
Density ( RWATA ) (%) 44.0 14.0 17.7 24.8 36.1 49.4 136 268
Beta 0.49 0.03 0.09 0.28 0.46 0.63 1.08 1.27
BIS ratio (%) 15.1 9.5 10.1 12.7 14.1 16.9 21.6 24.8
Equity (Me) 4,794 −0.19 25.7 150 1,026 2,794 18,263 87,981
Total assets (Me) 106,520 122 236 1,407 11,833 77,049 1,899,419 1,933,861
Panel B: LME bank-year (no. of obs: 121)
Means p (diff) p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
Pay-out (previous yr.) (%) 44.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.1 46.7 64.9 100 100
Pay-out (current yr.) (%) 39.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.8 67.9 100 100
Non-LME bank-year (no. of obs: 666)
Means p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
Pay-out (previous yr.) (%) 25.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.1 41.4 68.8 97
Pay-out (current yr.) (%) 23.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.5 36.8 65.9 97
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TABLE 4
European Liability Management Exercises 2009–2013
The table shows descriptive statistics of 720 European LMEs over the period April 2009 to December 2013, involving 121 bank-years. p1, p5, p25,
p50, p75, p95, p99 indicate percentile values for percentiles 1, 5, 25, 75, 95, and 99 and the median (p50). pi is the mean buyback premium: PX −PA,
where PX is the exchange price of the instrument expressed as a percentage of the nominal value of the instrument; PA is the price of the instrument
before the announcement, also expressed in a percentage of the nominal value of the instrument (PN). Potential gain is the potential fair value gain
that a bank could realize in a LME, based on the pre-announcement price of the nominal amount exchanged. Actual gain is the pre-tax fair value
gain that a bank realized in a LME, based on the exchange price of the nominal amount exchanged. Cost is the difference between potential gain
and actual gain. The denominators assets, risk weighted assets (RWA), and equity in Panel A are lagged. p (diff) tests the difference between the
two values reported to the left of this statistic. p-value tests the mean being 0. Offered is the mean amount the bank announces in the Liability
Management Exercise. Inefficiency is the ratio of cost over potential gain. Exchanged is the mean nominal underlying the bank bought back in the
Liability Management Exercise. ∆Reg. cap.: the italic font denotes the mean loss of total regulatory capital resulting from the LME. Success rate is
the mean of the ratio of exchanged over offered. Instruments is the number of instruments exchanged.
Panel A: Descriptives of buyback premiums (no. of transactions: 720) and annual gains and costs (no. of bank-years: 121)
Means p-value p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
Buyback premium (pi in %) 8.22 0.00 −1.39 −0.57 2.29 5.06 10.3 29.2 65.9
Potential gain (in bp of assets) 20.0 0.00 0.20 0.45 2.44 7.73 19.5 69.5 248
Actual gain (in bp of assets) 14.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.15 4.81 14.1 45.8 203
Cost (in bp of assets) 5.66 0.00 −0.34 0.03 0.51 1.97 4.85 26.9 49.6
Potential gain (in bp of RWA) 29.2 0.00 0.03 0.53 4.50 16.0 33.7 107 334
Actual gain (in bp of RWA) 21.8 0.00 −0.03 0.00 2.17 9.33 20.8 64.4 327
Cost (in bp of RWA) 7.35 0.00 −0.64 0.05 1.11 3.70 8.20 31.0 52.8
Potential gain (in bp of equity) 505 0.00 0.46 6.20 40.2 148 395 1,816 9,747
Actual gain (in bp of equity) 390 0.00 −0.49 0.00 19.5 97.4 279 1,288 9,548
Cost (in bp of equity) 115 0.00 −17.2 0.14 11.8 48.9 93.6 528 1,355
Panel B: Characteristics of LME transactions (no. of transactions: 720)
Eligibility Premium (pi) in p (diff) Offered(Me) Mean potential Inefficiency (%)
% of nominal (p-value) gain (%) = PremiumPotential gain
Tier 1 11.32 0.19 373 44.9 25.2Upper Tier 2 9.87 0.00 301 41.8 23.6Lower Tier 2 5.59 0.02 366 28.0 20.0Unsecured debt 2.48 762 17.3 14.3
Means 8.22 (0.00) 392 35.8 23.0
Eligibility Exchanged (Me) Success rate (%) # Instruments
∆Reg. cap.
Tier 1 187 54.0 280
Upper Tier 2 161 53.5 97
Lower Tier 2 179 52.8 302
Unsecured debt 392 51.0 41
Means 192 53.2 720
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TABLE 5
European Liability Management Exercises years, countries
The table shows amounts involved in European LMEs over the period April 2009 to December 2013. pi is the mean buyback premium: PX −PA,
where PX is the exchange price of the instrument expressed as a percentage of the nominal value of the instrument; PA is the price of the instrument
before the announcement, also expressed in a percentage of the nominal value of the instrument (PN). Potential gain is the maximum potential fair
value gain that a bank could realize in a LME, based on the pre-announcement price of the nominal amount exchanged, pre-tax. The Actual gain
is the pre-tax fair value gain that a bank realized in a LME, based on the exchange price of the nominal amount exchanged. Cost is the difference
between Actual gain and Potential gain. This is a measure of the cost of the LME. Inefficiency is the ratio of Cost over Potential gain. Offered is
the amount the bank announces in the buyback offer, in millions of e. −∆ Reg. cap. is the negative change in total regulatory capital resulting from
the LME. Bank-years is the number of sample bank-year observations.
Panel A: Gains and losses per year (amounts in Me)
Year pi (%) Potential gain Actual gain Cost Inefficiency (%) Offered −∆ Reg. cap. Bank-years
2009 10.06 9,002 6,814 2,188 24.3 33,982 19,278 25
2010 5.23 8,928 7,816 1,112 12.5 39,996 21,019 13
2011 7.10 12,641 9,871 2,770 21.9 70,856 35,375 36
2012 9.16 10,120 7,504 2,616 25.8 91,305 29,960 51
2013 9.60 859 439 420 48.9 15,715 5,305 18
Overall 8.22 41,550 32,443 9,107 21.9 251,854 110,937 143
Panel B: Gains and losses per country (amounts in Me)
Country pi (%) Potential gain Actual gain Cost Inefficiency (%) Offered −∆ Reg. cap. Bank-years
Austria 6.63 845 699 147 17.4 4,913 2,599 6
Belgium 15.67 969 735 235 24.3 2,126 1,775 3
Cyprus 3.00 151 141 9 6.0 413 314 1
Denmark 4.69 51 46 5 9.8 675 149 2
France 6.13 4,189 3,279 909 21.7 33,194 12,147 15
Germany 8.25 1,894 1,514 380 20.1 10,049 4,774 4
Greece 20.07 1,342 953 389 29.0 5,271 2,201 8
Ireland 4.34 11,109 10,083 1,025 9.2 28,573 18,024 11
Italy 4.23 3,815 2,961 853 22.4 60,159 14,723 17
Luxembourg 3.41 31 24 6 19.4 698 188 1
Netherlands 7.45 2,451 1,683 767 31.3 17,583 10,396 9
Portugal 22.67 1,493 911 582 39.0 5,951 2,119 6
Slovenia 7.43 1 1 0 0.0 100 1 1
Spain 10.93 3,478 1,800 1,678 48.2 35,305 14,282 31
Sweden 12.33 185 132 53 28.6 975 535 1
United Kingdom 6.94 9,548 7,480 2,068 21.7 45,869 26,711 27
Aggregate 8.22 41,550 32,443 9,107 21.9 251,854 110,937 143
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TABLE 6
Correlations for bank-years
The table reports correlations of variables from European LME data over the period April 2009 to December 2013. LME is 1 if a bank
engages in a LME during a fiscal year, else it is 0. SolvEquity is accounting equity divided by total assets. SolvTier 1 is Tier 1 capital divided
by risk-weighted assets. Size is the natural log of total assets in millions of euros. Pay-out is dividend as a proportion of net income. ROA
is net income over total assets. GIIPS is an indicator for LMEs from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Listed indicates whether
the bank is listed on a stock exchange. Business model is either “Retail-funded” or “Trading” based on the average values for gross loans
and interbank borrowing. Except for GIIPS, the variables of the upper panel are lagged variables.
Bank-year obs. (n = 645) LME SolvEquity SolvTier 1 Size Pay-out ROA GIIPS Listed Trading
SolvEquity −0.20
SolvTier 1 −0.15 0.40
Size 0.28 −0.64 −0.29
Pay-out 0.09 −0.03 −0.07 0.03
ROA −0.05 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.03
GIIPS 0.19 −0.06 −0.24 0.11 0.14 −0.20
Listed 0.00 0.23 0.03 −0.15 0.11 0.05 −0.02
Trading 0.29 −0.08 −0.02 0.07 −0.02 0.00 0.01 −0.21
Retail 0.39 −0.09 0.00 0.07 −0.04 −0.11 0.03 −0.33 0.23
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TABLE 7
LME model (first stage)
The table reports results of a probit regression that relies on European LME data over the period April 2009 to
December 2013. The dependent variable is 1 if a bank engages in a LME during a fiscal year, else the dependent
variable is 0.
LME[0,1] =β0 +β1Solvency+β2Size+β3Pay-out+β4ROA+β5GIIPS+β6Listed+
8
∑
n=7
βnBusiness model+ ε
SolvEquity is accounting equity divided by total assets. SolvTier 1 is Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets.
Size is the natural log of total assets in millions of euros. Pay-out is dividend as a proportion of net income. ROA
is net income over total assets. GIIPS is an indicator for Liability Management Exercises from Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain. Listed indicates whether the bank is listed on a stock exchange. Business model is either
“Retail-funded” or “Trading” based on the average values for gross loans and interbank borrowing. Pseudo-R2 is
McFadden’s pseudo-R2. Except for GIIPS, the regressors are lagged variables to respect the order of causality.
The regression model relies on p-values that account for two-dimensional within-cluster correlation (Petersen,
2009).
β p β p
SolvEquity (−) −5.55 0.00
SolvTier 1 (−) −6.88 0.00
Size (+) 0.25 0.00 0.28 0.00
Pay-out (+) 0.17 0.00 0.19 0.00
ROA (−) −0.21 0.24 −0.19 0.24
GIIPS (+) 0.73 0.00 0.62 0.00
Listed 1.31 0.00 1.25 0.00
Trading 2.99 0.00 3.08 0.00
Retail 2.92 0.00 3.07 0.00
Intercept −5.15 0.00 −5.03 0.00
Pseudo-R2 0.39 0.38
Wald χ2 111 138
Prob. > χ 0.00 0.00
Correctly classified (%) 89.0 87.3
No. of obs. 762 645
53
TABLE 8
Correlations for LMEs at instrument level
The table reports correlations of variables from European LME data over the period April 2009 to December 2013. pi is the buyback premium, namely the difference between the exchange
price and its price three days before the buyback announcement, expressed in percent of the nominal underlying value of the instrument. Tier 1 is an indicator variable for exchanged
instruments that are undated, permanent, capital instruments that are senior in ranking to common stock and always rank junior to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the
bank. Upper Tier 2 is an indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are undated, permanent, instruments that are subordinated in full to non-subordinated creditors. Lower Tier 2
is an indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are dated instruments of which the principal is subordinated to non-subordinated creditors. Unsecured are senior unsecured debt
instruments. VIX is the closing value of the CBOE Volatility Index, standardized to values between 0 and 1, measured at the announcement date. SolvEquity is accounting equity divided by
total assets. SolvCore Tier 1 is Core Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets, where Core Tier 1 capital is Tier 1 capital net of hybrid Tier 1 capital instruments. Size is the natural log of
total assets in millions of euros. EBA Recap is an indicator for observations of repurchases that took place from September to 7 December 2011.
1 These variables will the referred to in Table 10 below: Target is a categorical variable that increases with the loss-absorbing quality of the instrument. Its value is 4 for Tier 1, 3 for
Upper Tier 2, 2 for Lower Tier 2, 1 for Senior unsecured debt Discount is 1 minus the pre-announcement price expressed in fraction of the face value of the bought back instrument. Pay-out
is dividend as a proportion of net income. ROA is net income over total assets. GIIPS is an indicator for Liability Management Exercises from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Individual LMEs (n = 493) pi Tier 1 UT2 LT2 Unsecured V IX SolvEq SolvCT1 Size EBA Recap Target Discount Pay-out ROA
Tier 1 0.27
Upper Tier 2 0.10 −0.30
Lower Tier 2 −0.28 −0.69 −0.33
Unsecured −0.11 −0.20 −0.09 −0.21
VIX 0.25 0.19 −0.03 −0.11 −0.12
SolvEquity −0.21 −0.22 0.03 0.14 0.13 −0.23
SolvCore Tier 1 −0.17 −0.11 0.04 0.07 0.03 −0.21 0.51
Size −0.20 0.00 0.10 −0.07 0.01 0.07 −0.07 0.10
EBA Recap 0.10 0.12 −0.09 −0.02 −0.10 0.73 −0.22 −0.08 0.20
Target1 0.32 0.91 0.06 −0.73 −0.45 0.20 −0.24 −0.10 0.03 0.11
Discount 0.41 0.39 0.02 −0.28 −0.25 0.10 −0.01 0.35 −0.39 0.02 0.44
Pay-out 0.11 0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.01 −0.01 −0.20 −0.13 −0.16 −0.08 0.01 0.06
ROA −0.07 0.09 0.06 −0.15 0.05 0.10 0.07 −0.02 0.40 0.15 0.10 −0.34 −0.07
GIIPS 0.05 −0.16 −0.09 0.15 0.15 −0.26 0.36 0.15 −0.41 −0.34 −0.22 0.07 0.16 −0.18
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TABLE 9
Premium model (second stage)
The table reports results of a regression that relies on European LMEs over the period April 2009 to December 2013.
pi=β0 +β1Tier 1+β2Upper Tier 2+β3Lower Tier 2+β4V IX +β5Solvency+β6Size+β7EBA Recap+β8Mills′+ ε
For each individual bought-back instrument, the dependent variable (pi) is either the buyback premium, namely the difference between the exchange price and its
price three days before the buyback announcement, expressed in percent of the nominal underlying value of the instrument, or the inverse hyperbolic sine of the
premium: sinh−1 pi or ln(pi+
√
1+pi2). As the sample used for the regressions contains transactions where the exchanged instrument is a regulatory capital instrument
or an unsecured debt instrument, the coefficient values for Tier 1, Upper Tier 2 and Lower Tier 2 are relative to those of unsecured debt instruments. Tier 1 is an
indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are undated, permanent, capital instruments that are senior in ranking to common stock and always rank junior
to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the bank. Upper Tier 2 is an indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are undated, permanent,
instruments that are subordinated in full to non-subordinated creditors. Lower Tier 2 is an indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are dated instruments of
which the principal is subordinated to non-subordinated creditors. VIX is the closing value of the CBOE Volatility Index, standardized to values between 0 and 1,
measured at the announcement date. SolvEquity is accounting equity divided by total assets. SolvCore Tier 1 is Core Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets, where
Core Tier 1 capital is Tier 1 capital net of hybrid Tier 1 capital instruments. Size is the natural log of total assets in millions of euros. EBA Recap is an indicator
for observations of repurchases that took place from September to 7 December 2011. Mills’ is the inverse Mills ratio. The regression model relies on p-values that
account for two-dimensional within-cluster correlation (Petersen, 2009).
Dependent variable: sinh−1 pi pi
β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p
Tier 1 (+) 1.46 0.00 1.57 0.00 1.31 0.00 1.34 0.00 8.40 0.00 9.78 0.00 8.14 0.00 6.11 0.00
Upper Tier 2 (+) 1.13 0.01 1.33 0.00 1.12 0.01 1.08 0.01 7.63 0.01 10.1 0.00 8.74 0.00 6.73 0.00
Lower Tier 2 (+) 0.88 0.01 0.96 0.00 0.78 0.01 0.65 0.05 3.09 0.08 4.05 0.06 2.92 0.09 0.45 0.37
V IX (+) 2.47 0.00 2.23 0.00 2.15 0.00 1.85 0.00 15.7 0.00 12.9 0.00 12.4 0.00 10.6 0.00
SolvEquity (−) −10.1 0.00 −63.3 0.01
SolvCore Tier 1 (−) −11.2 0.00 −33.7 0.03
Size (−) −0.20 0.00 −0.20 0.00 −0.19 0.01 −2.44 0.00 −2.44 0.00 −1.86 0.00
EBA Recap −0.65 0.00 −0.40 0.04 −0.51 0.01 −0.19 0.24 −5.81 0.01 −2.83 0.10 −3.48 0.05 −1.15 0.29
Mills’ −0.20 0.15 −0.26 0.07 −0.09 0.30 −0.39 0.01 −3.14 0.09 −3.90 0.03 −2.88 0.06 −2.15 0.04
Intercept 0.00 0.00 3.18 0.00 3.81 0.00 4.66 0.00 1.90 0.00 32.7 0.00 36.6 0.00 30.3 0.00
Prob T1 = UT2 0.30 0.45 0.55 0.41 0.73 0.89 0.78 0.78
R2 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.20
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
# of obs. 593 593 593 493 593 593 593 493
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TABLE 10
Target instruments
The table reports results of regression results from European LME data over the period April 2009 to December 2013. The dependent variable
denotes the loss-absorbing quality of the repurchased instrument: 4 for Tier 1, 3 for Upper Tier 2, 2 for Lower Tier 2, 1 for Senior unsecured debt.
T[1..4] = β0 +β1Solvency+β2Discount+β3VIX+β4Size+β5Pay-out+β6ROA+β7GIIPS+
β8EBA Recap+β9Listed+
11
∑
n=10
βnBusiness model+β12Mills′+ ε
SolvEquity is accounting equity divided by total assets. Discount is 1 minus the pre-announcement price expressed in fraction of the face value
of the bought back instrument. VIX is the closing value of the CBOE Volatility Index, standardized to values between 0 and 1, measured at the
announcement date. Size is the natural log of total assets in millions of euros. Pay-out is dividend as a proportion of net income. ROA is net
income over total assets. GIIPS is an indicator for Liability Management Exercises from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Listed indicates
whether the bank is listed on a stock exchange. Business model is either “Retail-funded” or “Trading” based on the average values for gross loans
and interbank borrowing. Pseudo-R2 is McFadden’s pseudo-R2. The clustered OLS model relies on p-values that account for two-dimensional
within-cluster correlation (Petersen, 2009).
Clustered OLS Ordered Probit
β p β p β p β p
SolvEquity (−) −7.89 0.01 −7.90 0.01 −15.0 0.00 −15.0 0.00
Discount (+) 2.10 0.00 2.11 0.00 2.99 0.00 2.99 0.00
V IX (+) 0.92 0.02 0.92 0.02 1.01 0.04 1.01 0.04
Size 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.07
Pay-out −0.03 0.51 −0.03 0.58 −0.08 0.23 −0.08 0.32
ROA 11.6 0.00 11.6 0.00 18.4 0.01 18.4 0.01
GIIPS −0.20 0.06 −0.19 0.15 −0.22 0.22 −0.22 0.31
EBA Recap −0.40 0.15 −0.40 0.15 −0.45 0.22 −0.45 0.23
Listed −0.10 0.76 −0.09 0.78 −0.12 0.81 −0.13 0.81
Trading −0.45 0.11 −0.44 0.16 −0.76 0.11 −0.77 0.15
Retail −0.14 0.64 −0.13 0.78 −0.30 0.54 −0.31 0.66
Mills 0.01 0.97 −0.01 0.98
Intercept 1.66 0.00 1.62 0.14
Cut 1 −0.77 0.00 −0.80 0.00
Cut 2 1.17 0.00 1.13 0.00
Cut 3 1.59 0.00 1.56 0.00
R2, Pseudo-R2 0.32 0.32 0.18 0.18
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. of obs. 593 593 593 593
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TABLE 11
Cumulative abnormal announcement returns
The table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around an announcement of a LME as well as OLS results on the determinants of CARs.
The sample contains 90 LME announcements over the period April 2009 to December 2013. Abnormal returns for bank i on day t rely on the
market model, estimated over days [−250, −50] before the announcement using Datastream data. For the market index we use the EU market
index to estimate ARi,t = Ri,t − (β0,i +β1,iRM), see Benninga (2014); Kothari and Warner (2007) for methodology. SolvEquity is accounting equity
divided by total assets. Realized loss is the realized loss scaled by lagged equity: the amount equity holders lost. ROA is net income over total assets.
Permanent instrument is set to one (1) for Tier 1 instruments and Upper Tier 2 instruments. Size is the natural log of total assets in millions of euros.
Relative offer size is the amount offered at an announcement day, relative to the log of total assets. Mills’ is the inverse Mills ratio. The variables are
aggregated over the number of instruments that were involved in an LME, for each announcement day. The p-values adjust for clustering of LMEs
in event time (announcement date).
CAR[−2,10] CAR[−1,10] CAR[−2,15]
µ p µ p µ p
Mean values of CAR in % −1.62 0.01 −2.08 0.00 −1.85 0.02
Determinants of cumulative abnormal returns β p β p β p
SolvEquity (−) -1.01 0.03 -0.71 0.06 -0.65 0.07
Realized loss (−) -4.76 0.01 -2.83 0.00 -6.43 0.01
ROA(+) 2.57 0.04 2.20 0.01 2.74 0.04
Permanent instrument 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.00
Size -2.62 0.12 -1.36 0.44 -3.57 0.04
Relative offer size 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.00
Mills -0.02 0.78 -0.02 0.73 0.00 0.97
Intercept 0.37 0.17 0.19 0.50 0.43 0.11
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.26 0.13 0.34
# of obs. 90 90 90
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